US Diplomacy and Iran

This is a paper I wrote back in March on American goals and actions in Iran. It is analytical in nature, and therefore does not provide for policy proposal, but rather focuses of the 'hows and whys' of the current situation.

U.S. Diplomacy & Iran;
How we got where we are and where were headed





A Contemporary Analysis
∞ ¶ ∞
Adam W. Kohut
June 5th, 2006

In the National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Bush administration in March 2006, Iran is cited as the greatest challenge to American foreign policy. Its nuclear technology aspirations, sponsorship of terrorism, threat to Israel, denial of its citizenries “aspirations for freedom,” and its efforts to “thwart Middle East peace,” are all cited as the contentions the Bush administrations wishes to settle. This document comes in the midst of what has been a reinvigorated campaign against the Iranian government and its aspirations, which began in earnest in the beginning of this year. What this paper seeks to achieve is to look at the issues the current American administration has decided focus on, and delineate the steps it has taken to confront the Iranian government thus far. I will couple this empirical study with an analysis, backed by outside sources, of the actions taken and attempt to discern, effectively, the aims and intentions of the policies being put forth, and finally where there consequences will lead negotiations and possible action in the future.
I will begin with a brief on the history of American involvement in Iran. I include this as a precursor because of the significant role the legacy of our historical interactions plays on current politics. I will then begin to examine, in earnest, the consistent volleys between the two nations beginning in January of 2006. References will be made to planning and steps taken prior to this period, but its only recent public knowledge, and the ability for the limited retrospect it provides, gives one a keen sense of where actions will be taken in the future, and it is for these reasons my focus will be from the period already offered, but will at times delve to past resources.

History of American involvement in Iran; WWII forward

Prior to the Second World War and the necessity for moving supplies through to the Soviet Union, there was no direct American involvement in Iran. This initial involvement was minimal, but the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil company by the Iranian Majlis, under the leadership of Muhammad Mossadegh, on April 30th, 1951, began a dramatic shift in American interest in Iran. As negotiations between Iran and the British government, a 60% shareholder in Anglo-Iranian, became increasingly pragmatic the Truman administration began to attempt mediation between the two hostile parties. With the expulsion of the British Embassy in Tehran, after British plans for a coup were found out, they no longer had the capacity to internally direct opposition to Iranian nationalization of its oil resources. Thus began the overtures by British emissaries to their American counterparts for a CIA directed overthrow of Mossadegh and the constitutional government. However the American administration at the time was less than accommodating to the British on the issue. (Kinzer
It wasn’t until Eisenhower replaced Truman that the American attitude toward Iran made a significant shift. With Eisenhower came the Dulles brothers; John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, Secretary of State and Director of the CIA respectively. Both were in full promotion of direct American involvement in Iran as its independence generated fears of Soviet intervention in Washington. These fears were propounded by the Korean War, which marked the first major escalation of conflict between the Soviets and the Americans, as well as saw the first attempt by the U.S. of the policy of role back. The emboldment of American foreign policy by the conflict, pared with the Dulles brothers fervent communist paranoia led to an American backed coup orchestrated by CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt, under the code name operation Ajax. (Kinzer)
So in August 1953, after a failed first attempt, granted it was the fledgling CIA’s first, the American coup was successful in its objective. Mossadegh was captured and put on trial, the Shah flew into Tehran from his posh exile in France, and American involvement in Iran came to be firmly entrenched for over two decades. (Kinzer)
The following 25 years saw arguably the most oppressive Monarch of the past century rule Iran with an open US armory and an Iron fist. During the American and Iranian Monarch’s love fest United States arms sales to Iran totaled over $11.2 billion (FY 1950-1979). In the twelve years following the 53’ coup, the United States granted over $1.2 billion in aid to Iran, half of which was funneled to the military. In 1973, on his first official visit to Iran, Nixon concluded a deal with the Shah, which allowed him full access to procure any American military technology bar nuclear weapons. Between FY 1950-1977, Iran accounted for a full 25% of the $71 billion allocated through the Foreign Military Sales program, and was provided with over $20 billion worth of arms, training and upkeep through the US Military Assistance Program. (Library of Congress)
The extensive support from the US for the Shah translated to a relationship that saw Iran become the American watch dog in the Middle East so far as the US turned a blind eye to internal Iranian affairs and continued the exuberant amount of arms sales, much of which was used to oppress its own citizenry from balking under such harsh and impotent leadership, instead of warding off the Soviets.
Even with all the unbridled support and complacence in Iranian domestic actions American interests in Iran would be forever changed in 1979. A lesson the United States has never seemed to learn, and one they experienced throughout Latin America the preceding two decades, is that repression of dissent and popular voice through overt military action lends only to radicalize those in the population. The end result of this phenomenon is in almost all circumstances revolt, or revolution. In 1979 this theses was proved yet again, as the Shah’s influence on Iranian life crumbled, and like the ruins of Persepolis left only the smallest vestige of its past omnipotence.

The Revolution

The revolution in Iran, like all revolutions, is complex. Its support came from a great diaspora of political movements. For a fuller account Nikki R. Keddie’s “Modern Iran” and Roy Mottahedeh’s “The Mantle of the Prophet,” are prime, first stepping stones too a comprehensive understanding of the Iranian revolution. In short, the revolution in Iran took place because of the Shah’s inability to deal with an ever-increasing economic crisis and housing shortage, and his inability to effectively appease crucial factions of the Iranian populace. Including most notably the Bazaari middle class and powerful traditionalist Islamic clerics. (Keddie pg. 214-239) Opting for SAVAK repression, the Shah’s actions only worked to harden the resolve of those resisting his rule. No amount of domestic military support from the United States could quench the Iranian peoples thirst for change. Whereas the constitutional revolution that brought Mossadegh to power in 51’, with its populist anti-British rhetoric, was constitutional in nature, the 79’ revolution in Iran was far more reactionary (Eastern Cauldron) and, learning the lesson of the 53’ coup, vehemently anti-American. (Keddie pg. 238-239)

Stated goals of US foreign Policy

In laying out American foreign policy, in the National Security Strategy 2006, a broad set of US goals are listed, not the least of which pertains to nuclear proliferation. In the NSS 2006 nuclear proliferation is explicitly stated as posing the greatest threat to America’s national security. (NSS 2006 pg.19) The reasons behind this ranking can be found when one looks historically at what a nuclear weapons capability has provided to states opposing US actions; that is, the United States has never directly attacked any country possessing a nuclear weapons capability. This may not seem to say much to the unscrupulous observer of historical American foreign affairs, but when looking back one will find that the United States has consistently unilaterally, and under the cover of NATO, the UN and a plethora of doctrines, attacked and employed coercive uses of economic and military force against nations that have opposed its will for domination. As was the case in numerous countries including, but not limited too; Mexico, Spain, Bolivia, Salvador, Cuba, Korea, Japan (pre-WWII), The Philippines, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Russia (pre-Nuclear Russia), Lebanon, Hawaii, Haiti, Afghanistan, Greece, Turkey, Cambodia, and as stated above, Iran in 1953. The legacy of this imperialist adventurism has always been claimed in the name of freedom and defense. It was either to ‘liberate’ those oppressed, or to defend the ‘natural right’ of the American populace to free trade. (Lens, Bacevich, Horowitz)
The language of the NSS 2006 follows this historical line of reasoning, mirroring the line of the Truman Doctrine, it rationalizes closed markets as an assault to the American citizenries ‘natural’ rights, and further that ‘liberty’ (the right to buy, sell, trade, and own private property) is a fundamental basis to a ‘free society.’ The creation of which is essential to world peace because “free nations do not attack other free nations.”
This logic is found in the NSS 2006 beginning on page three. “The survival of liberty at home increasingly depends on the success of liberty abroad.” This connection made between ‘liberties advance’ abroad and the security of America’s homeland is the singularly most important aspect in understanding what is being called the ‘doctrine of preemption.’ The doctrine rationalizes that “[e]conomic freedom is a moral imperative. The liberties to create and build or to buy, sell, and own property is fundamental to human nature and foundational to a free society.” Freedom, Justice and Human Dignity are prerequisite to an effective Democracy (free government). “Free governments are accountable to their people, govern their territory effectively and pursue economic and political policies that benefit their citizens.” These same governments “do not oppress their people or attack other free governments.” (NSS 2006 pg.27)
The picture then begins to focus. Iran, in Washington’s eyes, denies its people their “fundamental human nature,” and by closing off large parts of its economy to private ownership (Iran nationally owns most of its major industries including; oil, aerospace, and the mining of natural resources,) denies the ‘fundamental’ right of the American populace to invest and take part in ownership of Iranian resources. Further, it is because Iran denies these rights that are fundamental to a free society, that a free society in Iran cannot take hold and therefore, the claims that Iran seeks to “thwart Middle East peace” are justified, seeing as non-free nations will attack others, or as is implied, be attacked by free nations to force them free.
I must diverge now from the philosophy of the NSS and focus on classic geopolitics and the relation it plays in American foreign policy, so that American interest may become crystal clear. As defined by Michael Klare in his essay “The New Geopolitics,” the phrase is reference to “the contention among great powers and aspiring great powers for control over territory, resources, and important geographical positions.” (Pox g.51) As he defines it, geopolitics is also constrained to a “self conscious set of beliefs on which elites and leaders of great powers act[sic].” (Pox, pg. 51) This sort of rationalization was seen, classically, during the period of European colonialization, where rival European powers contended for control of resources and militarily strategic points to access those resources. Klare contends that the “new central pivot” in the geopolitical game is south central Eurasia. The areas importance and influence of geopolitics is seen by its position as an historical cross roads between regions of the Eurasian continent and its contemporary importance as having the largest proved oil and natural gas reserves of any area in the world. Klare continues, and identifies the region as the only point currently in the world where major power interests collide. I do not agree on this point, given the strategic importance South East Asia is given in the NSC 2006 and guiding ideological documents like the Project for a New American Century’s (PNAC) Rebuilding Americas Defenses. However it is obviously the area of greatest importance at this particular place in time given the majority of conflicts and diplomatic pressures have been present there thus far.
In understanding how competing powers are conflicting in the region currently, one must look to what Iran’s greatest resources are; its energy resources. Iran has the second largest proven natural gas reserves, and its oil fields in the south are the fourth largest crude producers in the world. Cooperation on energy resource contracts and development between China, India and Russia has been greatly expanding in recent years. What began as a proposal by former Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, for the creation of a “strategic triangle,” has recently been revived. The three states share a strategic interest in, what is most alarming to American planners, “the push for a multi-polar world.” (Bajpaee pg. 5) This goes explicitly against the guiding ideological documents of the current American Administration. The “Wolfolwitz Doctrine” as well as the PNAC’s documents, both expressly states that the United States must stop, preemptively, the rise of any rival power. (Tyler)
The ‘strategic triangle,’ thus far, has been pursuing greater cooperation in energy exploitation through an Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, the development of the Yahavaran oilfield in Iran (Its largest onshore), and multiple deals of trading percentage holdings in each other’s energy resource markets. (Bajpaee pg. 5-8) The cooperation between the three involves, significantly, Iran and the Caspian Sea region. (Which all three have historical political and cultural relationships) The United States has taken notice of these relations, and specifically in the case of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, has voiced its opposition, and has further proposed its own trans-Afghan pipeline, which was made possible by the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
When these political developments are taken with consideration of the ‘geopolitics’ spoken of by Klare, and further couple it with the already explained American philosophy behind preemption and defense, the current US interest in Iran is clear to see. Not only is Iran a threat to peace and American security because of its ‘tyrannical’ limits to human freedom, the increasing influence of the ‘strategic triangle’ posses the risk of the development of a multi-polar world. In Washington’s eyes it is a strategic and moral imperative that this not succeed. Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability further compounds the problems posed to American interest globally, because of the deterrence capability it provides to the Iranian regime.


Why the impasse over nuclear proliferation?

The source of conflict between the United States and Iran over is nuclear program comes from the American claim that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. The United States believes that Iran’s hidden acquisition of centrifuges from a black market ring run by former Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, its “refusal to negotiate in good faith” (after two years of doing so) and come into compliance with a draft resolution passed in the U.N. Security Council calling on it to halt enrichment, and finally, Ahmandinejad's call for Israel to “be wiped off the face of the earth,” all as reasons that make Iran’s “true” intentions self evident. (NSS 2006 pg. 20) Iran contends, to the contrary, that its program is only for ‘peaceful’ purposes, and that only after two years of ‘good faith’ diplomacy, and stalled European negotiations, did its resume its enrichment of uranium, which is its right as a signatory of the NPT.
Those are the publicly stated contentions at hand however the elephant in the room is what already was mentioned above. The United States has never attacked another nuclear power. The most contemporary and telling example of this is the unfolding story of negotiations with the Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK). American rhetoric under the Bush administration was confrontational to the DPRK until in mid 2003 Pyongyang announced it has converted spent nuclear fuel rods to weapons grade plutonium and subsequently in August 2003 officially declared itself a nuclear power.
The United States amidst all of this has only kept long standing economic sanctions against the DPRK, pursuing no further action except for participating in stagnant six party talks, that as of yet, have come to no avail. In September 2005 during the fourth round of said talks the US committed to non-aggression guarantees, which included the non-deployment and use of nuclear weapons.
These concessions and the lack of any increase of sanction against the DPRK after it had acquired nuclear weapons serves a glaring example to Iran and the rest of the world as to why, for security, they must procure them. The US knows the capability nuclear weapons provide and the danger they pose when in its adversary’s hands. Especially when it has massed troops, military instillations, and maybe most importantly allies near by. As was put by Michael Nacht, the former assistant director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Clinton Administration;
Since the Cold War, the top US military priority, as stated in congressional testimonies, has been to deploy the world’s most effective power projection forces. A power projection force operates in or near hostile territory…Any power projection force needs air bases and ports of debarkation and logistics centers for sustained operations…Their number is limited-a handful in Iraq, and not many more…These facilities are highly vulnerable to inaccurate nuclear missile attack …The nuclear threat to essential US force-projection assets largely counterbalances the advantage provided by US conventional forces. (Mian pg.4)

It cannot be underscored enough the leveling capability nuclear weapons play on the field of military conquests. It is because of this essential ‘deterrence’ capability, Iran’s ability to attain it, and its location in the heart of the “central pivot” of the region contended for by geopolitical actors, that the United States has rated nuclear proliferation and Iran, together, as it’s greatest global concerns. It is by understanding this relation to American strategic goals when engaging in the wiry game of global and domestic diplomacy that we can begin to asses the actions thus far being taken and where they lead the prospect of diplomacy and military action in the future.

The Means to the Ends (American Strategies for Iranian compliance)

For the two years leading up until Iran broke International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seals at the nuclear research facility in Natanz, Iran, in a gesture of good faith, had voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment and allowed consistent survailence and nuclear inspection rights to the IAEA. During the two year hiatus in research the EU-3, consisting of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, were in negotiations with Tehran over a compensation package that would allow for full compliance with Article II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, (NPT) which stipulates any “non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes…not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons”, (NPT pg. 2) while allowing for Tehran to develop the infrastructure for a civilian nuclear program.
Iran broke the IAEA seals on January 10th, 2006 after threatening to do so for some time because of the stagnant negotiations. While the two year halt on research was part of a strategy of confidence building by then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, the newly elected Ahmandinejad and his government “eventually concluded that it would never achieve its goal by acceding to the West’s demands.” According to Javad Vaeidi, the Iranian Supreme Security Council’s deputy. (Slackman) It is from this point that Tehran has charted a new course in its diplomacy over nuclear technology. Tehran has asserted its right under Article IV of the NPT to develop a research and capacity for nuclear power needs, and because that right is protected by its status as a signatory of the NPT, it has seen no reason thus far to halt any nuclear research. Mr. Vaeidi went on to describe the new path of diplomacy Iran has pursued as “successful,” and saw no likely change in the Iranian stance in the future. (Slackman)

Since the shift in Iranian strategy there has been an exponential increase in American pressure on Iran and other member of the international community to halt the development. To this point, the United States has focused its diplomatic efforts in three defined ways. The first has been through economic sanction, both unilateral and attempted bi-laterally; the second, through the threat of force; the third, through “carrot and stick” negotiations involving the EU-3, Russia, China, and most recently the US itself. As I will show below, all three tracks thus far have been pursued with no considerable change in the Iranian or American stance.
Throughout the process of negotiations the United States has continued unilateral economic sanctions that have been in place for some time, and more recently has begun to pursue newer and more far-reaching attempts at economic sabotage. An article in the New York Times on May 22, 2006 illuminates the newest of such strategies. “Prodded by the United States with threats of fines and lost business, four of the biggest European banks have started curbing their activities in Iran.” The effort has been undertaken by the Treasury and State Department, which has already imposed a $100 million fine against banking giant UBS and a similar $80 million fine against ABN Amro, both for moving money to Iran, which was subject to US sanctions at the time. The four banks cited in the article include the two listed above as well as Credit Suisse banks of Switzerland and HSBC of London. Because these international banks operate and have branches within the United States they are subject to domestic U.S. policy, so that unless the banks are willing to incur the wrath of the U.S. Treasury Department, their international dealings will have to conform to U.S. policy. (Weisman)
The tactic has thus far been effective in that the sanctions apply primarily with the trade and transaction of U.S. dollars, and being that all oil is bought and sold on the international market with the dollar, and Iran’s oil revenues averages $300 Million a day, Iran’s increasing inability to convert its dollars through international banks is a major set back to its economy. This is only further compounded by the United States using its weight in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to get Iran’s rating as a business risk elevated in April of this year. (Weisman)
These efforts, when combined with the credible threat of the use of force against Iran, has caused Iran’s overall economic growth to slow to less than 5 percent, its stock market has dropped more than 20 percent in the past year, new investment and construction have declined, and Iranian’s themselves have been sending greater and greater amounts of capital abroad and converting their investments to gold. It is because of U.S. monopoly on the dollar and the eminence of New York as the global banking hub that has allowed the US to pursue economic sanctions to such a generally potent effect. However analyst such as Karim Sadjadpour, who works for the International Crisis Group, believe that short of a sweeping oil embargo and gasoline blockade, Iran imports 40% of its gasoline, Iran, based on it’s daily oil revenues, “can weather the storm.” (Weisman)
As Washington has looked beyond the scope of unilateral sanctions to the UN Security Council, its overtures have not been warmly met by China or Russia. Both countries carry a veto power in the Security Council, and as was mentioned earlier, based on both parties interest in the success of the “strategic triangle,” and the formers heavy dependence on Iranian oil and natural gas reserves, there is small chance that either will be willing to solicit economic sanctions against what has become a vital asset to the success of the threes goal of a multi-polar world. Without their support sanctions, let alone the go ahead for military action, are wholly improbable, and the overall prospect of unilateral economic sanctions from the United States changing the current course of the Iranian regime is even less likely.
Economic sanctions have been backed by what has become a consistent barrage of US threat and intimidation; funneled through both diplomatic, and covert channels. On April 9th, 2006 the Washington Post reported that the Bush administration was “studying options for military strikes against Iran.” In a press conference on April 18th, President Bush was asked whether US action could include the “possibility of a nuclear strike.” The president replied: “All options are on the table.” In a widely circulated article by Seymour Hersh published in The New Yorker, it is revealed that government planners have been “drawing up lists of targets, and [sending in] teams of American combat troops…under cover, to collect targeting data and establish contact with anti-government ethnic-minority groups.” Hersh continues to cite officials who have stated that the use of a “bunker busting tactical nuclear weapon” was actively being considered. (pg.3) Its use would be specifically for the two known underground nuclear research facilities at Natanz and Arrak. One official cited states that if the U.S. were to bomb Iran to stop its nuclear research, “you might as well improve your lie across the board,” implying that the Administration would look beyond nuclear research targets and expand into hitting other vital industrial, military and communications centers.
There is no public consensus on what the threats mean. Kori Schake, a former National Security Council staff member for the President, said; “any talk of a strike is the diplomatic gambit to keep pressure on others that if they don’t help solve the problem, we will have too.” While a former Pentagon policy official, Kurt Campbell believes “the Bush team is looking at the viability of air strikes simply because many think air strikes are the only real option ahead.” (Linzer) Either interpretation is viable, and evidence exists to support both, because in both instances the interpretations prove to be true.
Thus far the threat of American use of force is probably what has kept European pressure on Iran at the point it currently is. Germany and France both make Iran’s two top import partners, respectively. There are considerable amounts of trade money, as well as dependence on both economies for gulf based oil exports, to move either country not to act on Iran. As stated above and evidence from their opposition to the Iraq war indicate, they are not in the game of regional geopolitics that accounts for the reason of US interest in Iran and fear of its possible weapons program. Instability in the region and the subsequent oil market price hike (“Crude Oil Rise Amid Security Concerns”), gives good reason for the European states to be taking active interest in dissuading Iran through diplomatic means. American threats however are two fold and have served a secondary purpose to increasing European resolve.
“Nuclear diplomacy” as it has been called is not a new strategy to be employed by the United States. Whenever it has had a ‘nuclear monopoly,’ and even at times when it has not, past administrations and present have shown a willingness to employ the tactic of threatening the use of nuclear force to elicit its general demands from a State. Beyond the threat of nuclear weapons, the threat of force in general has been used as a diplomatic tool, especially so post WWII. (Horowitz) If one takes history as a lesson then the move by the Bush Administration, to threaten force and the use of nuclear weapons is classic in its consistent with power politics.
Further as was shown with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the current American administration will ‘preventively’ attack another nation when it finds that nation to be a threat to U.S. security. It has made a sterling example of Saddam's regime, and to draw a parallel to 1945, when the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan to elicit an example from it, I do not believe is off base.
When taken in light of how the NSS 2006 defines what posses a threat to American security, Iran’s status defined as a “rouge state” gives credible evidence to both Schake’s and Campbell’s assumptions. The Bush administration views Iran and its possible proliferation of nuclear weapons as the greatest threat it currently faces. It is only obvious that military planners would be actively engaging strategies for a ‘preemptive’ attack on Iran, and that the administration, if it does not get its way, will use them.
The third and currently most active option being pursued by Washington is the “carrot and stick.” The term has come to be used by media and those involved in its planning, but original credit must go to Kenneth Pollack. Pollack, former NSC head of Persian gulf affairs, in a tome of foreign policy analysis entitled The Persian Puzzle, first spoke of using a “carrot and stick” approach in 2004. (Pollack pg. 405) What Pollack’s approach entailed was a multi-lateral agreement signed by the US, EU, Russians, Chinese, and Japanese, that had in it a defined structure of incentives-carrots- and disincentives-sticks- for movement by the Iranian regime in ‘positive and negative’ directions respectively. The rational behind such an approach is that Iran would know before hand what the outcome of its actions would be, therefore if Iran chose not to move in the direction outlined by the powers as positive preordained punitive actions would be immediately enacted by the whole range of powers in unison. This Pollack rationalizes, and is supported by Sadjapour, is the only effective way to employ sanctions against Iran. Where the power of such an agreement is truly found however, is how it defines the decision maker in negotiations. In the case of the ‘carrot and stick’ the ball would be in Iran’s court, given that the parameters and timeline of options is already set out and then presented to Iran in a package that it can either choose to accept or not. In such a case the powers can make conditions knowingly unacceptable to Iranian officials, but because of the framework Iran’s refusal to move in a positive direction can only be blamed, at least by the “international community,” on Iran. This provides a very lucrative political tool for justification to the global populaces by an orientalist tinted, heavily state influenced media lens. (McChesney) While this is the most promising of the options put forth by Pollack where the Bush administration failed, and what Pollack cited as its greatest challenge, was to muster enough international support for the idea before Iran became such a pressing issue for the United States.
Because Washington diverted its resources into other areas, putting all of its chips on the negotiations between the EU-3, Russia and Iran, until Iran resumed enrichment in March, it has lost valuable time in being able to put together a broad coalition of nations to address Iran with the uncompromising manner it wishes to. The apparent eagerness Washington feels it has to act on Iran now, has only made its situation more difficult. Recently however the US has made a dramatic and complex diplomatic move. On Sept 31, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a press conference that the US was willing to join the negotiations between Iran and European powers. Hailed as a bold gesture by main stream media, when put under scrutiny the offer takes on different light, (The AP)
As pretext to Washington joining any direct talks with Iran, it requires that Iran halt all uranium enrichments activities immediately, something that Iran has consistently before said it will not do. As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington commented, “Rice’s reticence about offering the possibility of normalized relations, and the unwillingness to offer security guarantees if Iran comes into compliance [with U.S. demands of ending uranium enrichment], may make it very difficult for Iran to accept.” Kimball further notes that the US did not insist that North Korea first cease plutonium operations, and did hold out the enticement of eventual security guarantees when joining talks with other nations about the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program.
In response to the US overture foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said, “[w]e won’t negotiate about the Iranian nation’s natural nuclear right, but we are prepared, within a defined, just framework and without any discrimination, to hold dialogue about common interests.” “We do not want trouble; we do not want confrontation. We just want our rights” Vaeidi added. (Slackman) By attaching the precondition, Washington’s overture becomes much less an extension of an olive branch, and far closer a small pox ridden blanket. The precondition itself implies that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, which it has denied from the onset. Also if the Iranian regime agreed to talks with such a precondition it would be saying in principle that it was willing to give up its right to nuclear technology. All of this just for the privilege of direct talks with Washington “is something Iran is unwilling to do,” according to Mottaki. (Slackman) Within this framework it is obvious to see that the gesture by Dr. Rice was little more than a political strengthening card.
Along with the US offer came a packaged plan agreed upon by the EU-3, Russia, China, and the US that offered an array of incentives for Iran to stop uranium enrichment. The incentives include, it is speculated, provision to provide Iran with a “light-water reactor, trade benefits and other economic incentives.” (More Hot Air over Iran) What it did not include however was any reference to a non-aggression guarantee by the United States, which has been required by the Iranian government for any movement. (Slackman) The package does offer vague language of possible punitive measures if Iran does not comply with the incentives, however it offers no specificity to what those possible measures may be. This is most likely the reason why Russia and China signed off on the agreement, speculates Ehsan Ahrari of the Asia Times.
What the result of the past negotiations amounts too then is the political benefits alluded to above when describing Pollack’s ‘carrot and stick’ proposal. In the case of the “bold” move by Washington to offer direct talks, even Dr. Rice suggested to reporters that the US offer was not designed for the Iranian regime, but was rather an overture designed at increasing “positive relations with the Iranian people.” (Peterson) It may have been more accurate however for Dr. Rice to have replaced Iranian people with American. The fact here is that no gesture was made, merely a political gambit by the administration to strengthen its hand when pressing for further punitive action when Iran would undoubtedly refuse to comply with the offer. This move was strategically made with the subsequent sending of the package of incentives to Iran. Because the package is vague in its punitive measures, again hence the signing by Russia and China, it also leaves open the scope and range of American options for future action.
Because of the ambiguity over punitive measures, the offer is not quite what Pollack was envisioning, but obviously was at such short notice, the only way for Washington to get the whole Security Council (plus Germany) to agree on any such measure. Though in the short term it leaves little chance of a united front to ‘punish’ Iran, the fact that it does note non-compliance may be punished, betters American efforts at pushing through sanctions in the Security Council in the future. The recent moves then, though flagrantly nothing more than a knowingly unacceptable ultimatum, were brilliant in their capability to strengthen Washington’s hand with its populace and in future negotiations with Security Council members. The road were these tactics take the impasse over Iran’s nuclear program however is a perilous one.

Where Does the Yellow Brick Road Go?

“This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided.”
-National Security Strategy 2006
In reference to ongoing negotiations with Iran

The “diplomatic effort,” as one can see, will not succeed. By structuring its demands through thinly veiled language of “carrots and sticks”, while applying consistent threats on the use of force, including nuclear weapons, continued attempts to destabilize the Iranian regime through covert action and sustained economic sanctions, the United States has done nothing more than given Iran an ultimatum; Comply or you will be replaced.
Iran is in a geopolitically vital region of the world; it has the second largest gas reserves, is the world’s fourth largest oil exporter, and controls the straight of Hormuz, the bottleneck of Middle East oil shipping. It is a vital part of the “strategic triangle’s” ever-increasing interest in energy resource development and control in the region, as well as the creation of a “multi-polar” world. It supports the Hezbollah movement in southern Lebanon, has threatened Israel, and most importantly, is on track to developing an independent nuclear program that could result in Iranian possession of a nuclear weapon capability, which as history has shown is the only effective means of dissuading American intervention.
It is Iran’s pragmatic stance to American interest and its vital role and position in the richest energy producing region in the world, that is of greatest concern to officials in Washington. The threat to US hegemony from the creation of a multi-polar world via an ever-competitive EU and China, and the current block out of American private interest’s ability to invest, are the base components for American interest in control. We are at a time that is seeing the fall of US dollar hegemony and everything that is based upon it. Increasingly competitive European markets have already overtaken the dollar in value of exchange, and the East Asian economies productive capacity far out paces that of the United States. If the US is to cap this advance, American domination of Iran is vital for its continuation as global hegemonic power. That goal is explicitly espoused in the National Security Strategy 2006; “We choose leadership…[w]e seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it…” It is clear then that the “negotiations” taking place, can be nothing but an ultimatum. Washington’s control of Iran is fundamental to its goals, and if Tehran is not willing to give in under threat and economic coercion, the only choice left in American official’s eyes is domination through force.



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The Development of Contemporary Egyptian Labor-Goverment Relations

The Egyptian labor movement shared the experiences of many of its colonial dominated kin. The creation of a cohesive working class set the groundwork for the creation and politicolization of the ensuing labor movement. In Egypt however, the unique experience of the labor movement in a paternalistic nationalist leadership acted as a means for the co-option of labor power by the state apparatus in the post revolutionary period. This historical experience of labor during the first half of the 20th century will help to explain the current situation of labors complete disenfranchisement, and the macro-economic conditions currently acting in Egypt.
The instigation of organized labor has historically stemmed from the development of a singular, large employment industry, where a distinct “working” class can be economically and socially discerned from the owners of production. This development of the working class comes, as economic conditions make personally sustanitive farming unavailable to what was a majority rural population, thereafter causing an exodus to cities and other concentrated areas of industry for employment opportunities. At this point the peasant’s only means of employment comes through wage labor, and he is subsequently alienated from the material production of labor. This movement from the ownership of ones labor, to the selling of ones labor to another individual, gives rise to the distinct class division of proletariat and capitalist. The shift from a life where the authority of survival is ‘nature,’ to one where the control of ones material well being lies in the hands of a tangible and discernable person(s), is one of the principle factors that gives rise to a working class consciousness. This consciousness defines workers as sharing like livelihoods distinct from that of the capitalist. This in turn leads to the discovery of workers collective power as a means of effectively improving ones singular livelihood. This short, general description of the development of a working class and the beginnings of organized labor action, was mirrored by the development of class and collective action in Egypt at the start of the 20th century, and would continue to characterizes its existence through to the military nationalism of the Nasser regime.
In the nineteenth century the Egyptian peasant’s ability to viably continue their existence as such became increasingly unavailable. Through heavy taxation, foreclosure due to non-payment of debt, and the Muslim law of inheritance - coupled with rapid population growth - many Egyptian peasants were left with landholdings inadequate for their personal means. This had the effect of pushing many peasants to find agricultural oriented work in seasonal and unskilled labor jobs. Due to Egypt’s export oriented economy - based on its foreign dominance under British tutelage - much of this work was concentrated in the transportation and packaging industries, and subsequently these industries were the first to experience labor unrest.
This sort of unskilled labor was dependent upon seasonal needs, and often fluctuated daily. Employers would hire a labor contractor that would daily find the needed number of employees. The contractor would be in charge of finding laborers, supervising the work, and would be given the workers pay to distribute, taking his fee from that pay. He would often employ workers at a set rate, and many times would also act as a local moneylender, charging high interest and deducting what he was owed from the workers salary. This organization of daily employment and means of payment made income insecurity and constant unemployment a prolific problem for the masses of the transitional Egyptian peasantry. Because of this sort of flexible daily employment, and the numerous amounts of persons looking for work, a constant glut to the available working pool was generated and further depressed wages and promoted job insecurity. These conditions are what led to the first act of organized labor protest in modern Egypt.
In April 1882 the coal heavers of Port Said went on strike. This first strike was not a product of organized union work, in fact non-such existed at the time in Egypt, nor was it an internal guild conflict as Benin and Lockman argue (pg. 30). The exact origins remain unknown due to a lack of credible sources, it does, however, appear to be a worker and labor contractor created movement, as the strikers dismissed an offer by the government to lessen the percentage cut of the contractors in order to increase their pay. However it formed, the collective action, and subsequent threats of action induced the company owners to grant the wage increase, from one franc per piece to two. Future action by the coal heavers however focused greater attention on the presence of the contractors, and when they again went on strike in April 1907 a principle demand was for their abolition. This trend will lead one to postulate that the collective action taken by workers was principally organized by them.
Though the coal heavers would eventually disappear once oil took over as the principal fuel for shipping, this early example shows the beginnings of class struggle. As a yet to be formed working class - given the ties most wage laborers at the time still had with their rural villages - engaged in the struggle for more adequate compensation for their labor, the ‘us and them’ distinction between employees and employers had begun to form and with it the class consciousness that would define the development and trade unionism and workers movements through the first half of the 20th century.

Because of the mainly seasonal employment of wage laborers, their still strong ties to peasant land, and prevalence of foreign-born manufacture workers (there were 147,000 foreign workers in Egypt by 1907), class cohesion was slow to form in Egypt. As some large-scale employers began to develop however, labor activism became an ever more prevalent force. This early concentrated activism was centered mostly in the cigarette rolling industries and the Cairo Tramway Company’s (CTC) workers. Both these industries experienced labor unrest early in the 20th century, the cigarette workers led mostly by ethnically Greek laborers who had previous experience with labor activism, and indigenous Egyptian workers for the CTC. In both instances the demands of the striking workers became more mature and reflected a growing awareness of the circumstances that surrounded and affected the workers condition.
For example, in October of 1908 a constituency of Cairo tramwaymen had begun meeting and formulated a list of demands that were submitted to the Belgian-owned company, threatening to strike if their demands were not met. Beyond simply asking for an increase in their wage the tramwaymen demanded; the eight hour day, choice of months vacation of months pay per year, the prohibition of inspectors physically or verbally striking and humiliating workers, the reinstatement of workers unjustly fired, the establishment of a committee, composed equally of workers and company representatives to investigate alleged infractions of work rules, and decide on penalties, no dismissal without good cause (and a months severance pay when justified), adequate uniforms at company expense, and the firing of several disliked company employees. These demands showed a greater understanding of the conditions surrounding capitalist employment, and can be seen as the vanguard of workers demands in future labor movements of Egypt.
The tramwaymen not only looked for an increase in the proportional payment for the selling of their labor, but a higher quality of life through a shorter work day and respect from managers, as well as a reduction in the power of management through the establishment of the proposed committee and justified/compensated dismissal. Workers in these industries had begun to realize not only the importance of organized collective action, but were showing an expressed interest in the management of the company. By demanding shared power between management and workers, it is apparent that the consciousness of divided classes with distinct interests was beginning to be formed, and the understanding of the means through which one gained or lost power were becoming apparent.
In the case of the cigarette rollers (WN 49-57) and the Cairo tramwaymen the formalization of labor organization into unions followed the workers first collective action. On March 8, 1909 the workers of the CTC founded its first union and set the stage for widespread labor struggles throughout Egypt until Abd al-Nasir and the Free Officers came to power.

Nationalism and the Egyptian Labor movement

Labor unions were slow to flourish in Egypt. Outside of the cigarette rollers, Cairo tramwaymen, and the MTWU (Manual Trades Workers Union), which only had 1043 members from a diaspora of trades by 1921 (WN pg.69 Table 2), unions were almost non-existent. It wasn’t until the First World War and its aftermath that large-scale industry was sufficiently able to expand in Egypt, and subsequently allow for the greater development of Unionization through the expansion of the working class.
During the war Britain’s grip around Egypt tightened, and had the effect of suffocating, for the time, its nationalist and workers movements. However because of decreased competition from already industrialized European manufacturers, and the increased demand for industrial production that stemmed from the war, Egyptian industry greatly expanded in the years during and preceding the First World War. Most significantly Egyptian industrialists – usually foreign capital or muattamsier (foreign born, “Egyptionized” capitalists) owned - were able to grow by expanding into the now open domestic consumption market that, before the war, had been largely satisfied by imports from Europe. This expansion of large-scale industry was a prime factor in the development of labor activism. As was seen before, in a labor market dominated by demand for unskilled day laborers, worker organization and collective action is exceedingly difficult. Commonly laborers do not work together for extended periods of time, and the endemic job insecurity and resulting glut in the available-unemployed work force, gives the employer the ability to easily find replacement labor in case of worker unrest. Once Egyptian industry was able to mature and start hiring skilled work forces in concentrated industrial locals, organization, a consciousness of class identity, and collective action become a possibility for labor.
The formation of the industrialized working class is what enabled labor organization in Egypt. Politically however, it is the economic circumstances resulting from capital allocation trends, during and after the First World War, which most dramatically affected the course of Egyptian history. The merger of the Egyptian working class and the Nationalist movement came about because of several factors. Food shortages and rising inflation, wrecked havoc upon the Egyptian economy, and most poignantly on the working poor, and when coupled with the injustice of British conscription of hundreds of thousands of Egyptians to serve as laborers for the Allied forces in the Middle East, the rising tide of resentment to British domination (i.e. Nationalism) became inextricably intertwined with the socio-economic factors so harshly effecting workers that were a result of Britain’s involvement in the war. Because of the way these forces played out, we will see that the success of the workers movement became to be understood as one in the same with Nationalist interest.

Workers and the Wafd

During the war and immediately after restrictions on the amount of land planted for cotton were lifted by the British. Though this had a positive effect on large landowners, who benefited from cottons increased market value, and in some cases offered greater employment for the laboring class, the loss of land dedicated to agricultural foodstuffs, combined with a fall of imports from Europe and the demand levied by Allied troops in the region, created a massive food shortage. This was further compounded by a steady rise in inflation (WN pg. 86-87 Table 3). These combined factors culminated in the social transformation of 1919.
In 1918, as the war came to an end, a group of large landowners with nationalist tendencies joined together to form the Wafd. It’s leader, Sa’d Zaghlul Pasha, put forward the demand for full Egyptian independence, and began forming a delegation that would travel to the Peace Conference being held in Europe to press this demand. The full independence of Egypt was the expressed end of the nationalist sentiment there, and though the Wafd was a principally bourgeois political party, and its aim was the transfer of power from a British dominated elite to an indigenous Egyptian elite, it was the only political party on the scene during this period that proposed a fulfillment of the nationalist sentiment. The Wafd in fact were quite conservative on labor issues, and had showed no support for any militant action, mass agitation, and much less, a social revolution.
For workers in this case the drive for nationalism, and subsequent support for the Wafd, was because of its historical experience under a British controlled economy. British controlled police had up to that point been the principal means through which strikes were broken; the labor contracting system had been established by British owned enterprises, and the lack any legislation for workers rights had existed under a British dominated government. For the workers of Egypt the fulfillment of the nationalist goal was a means to remove one major obstacle on the way to egalitarian rights. Though the ends of both social strata were different, the means they would be attained by coincided. So under the burgeoning bourgeois leadership of the Wafd, and with the popular support of workers the first nationalist upsurge in Egypt began.
In August 1919 the Cairo tramway workers went on strike, apparently because the CTC was planning on mass firings. This seemingly independent act had the effect of bursting the damn upon labor unrest that had existed since the war. Within days a mass of workers where on strike throughout the entirety of Egypt. All tramways systems in Egypt’s three major cities were on strike, railway men were on strike, bakers, journalist, tailors, carpenters, electricians, bank employees, waiters, kitchen workers, cigarette rollers, sugar mill workers, and more. This wave of labor activism was accompanied by a massive increase in the formation of unions in many of these industries, particularly among white-collar workers. The spread of unrest and unionization however was not independent. British intelligence from the time indicated a group of Italian radicals, who - with support from the Wafd - were actively attempting to generalize the strike and encourage the formation of unions. Though this doesn’t show complete supervision by the Wafd in labor militancy, it begins to exemplify the cohesion that was slowly developing between the two classes. Particularly on the side of the Wafd who were now beginning to support labor unrest as they saw the benefits to their own political agenda form. In the four years preceding the August strike wave labor unrest continued as inflation sustained its rise (WN pg. 86-87 Table 3), and soon one could not tell a difference between nationalist and labor activism. Some high members of the Wafd were connected to terrorist organizations that were in turn connected to unions; many of the top positions in unions became to be held by Wafd members – the two movements had forged into one.
In the aftermath of 1919 the Wafd was elected to power in January of 1924. Soon after its installment the Wafd moved to isolate and dismantle forces, particularly those within the urban working class, which could pose a threat to its power. It first moved to crush communist elements within the labor movement as well as the CGT, and also took control over the Cairo Tramway Worker’s Union. After this the Wafd looked to consolidate power over the unions already within its sphere of influence and created the General Federation of Labor Unions in the Nile Valley. This paternalism, however, was not meant to embolden workers, but rather to co-opt the organizational structures of the unions as a means to suppress and control militant labor activism. The members of the Wafd government were looking to attract investors and foreign capital, and the preoccupation of negotiating with the British, meant that little attention was paid to the continuing demands and unrest emanating from the disenfranchised workers. It is because of the Wafd’s conservative disposition and class basis that the promises vocalized to labor during its rise to power did not materialize.
The Wafd did not stay in power long. By the end of 1924 failure to negotiate full independence with the British left the Wafd with no clear intentions. Working with the British, King Fu’ad was able, under threat of the British armed forces, to cause the resignation of Zaghloul and the dismantling of the Wafd government. With its fall also came the fall of the GFLU. Because of the top down structure of union organization sought by the Wafd the unions could not survive. Stripped of a sympathetic government, the organizational leaders of their movements and now faced with a hostile and oppressive regime, labor activism again quickly faded.
There thus began a cycle in Egyptian socio-politics that would act to form labor consciousness, and affect the way and means it would organize. Because of workers continued popular support for the Wafd, the reactionary regime that King Fu’ad and the British implemented came down equally as hard, if not more so, on labor. The Wafd however would survive, sustain the links to its popular base, and through organizing boycotts, protests and other collective action would eventually force the British and Fu’ad to recognize that any bargain made to secure Egypt’s independence (even if it were merely nominal), would only be popularly recognized if done so by the Wafd. Inevitably free elections would be held in accordance with the 1923 constitution, and the Wafd would return to power and the whole cycle would start again.
It is through this recurrent sequence of events that labor began to see its interest interlocked with nationalist interests. This reality of labor politics in Egypt was one of the greatest supports and reasons for the success of the Free Officers, RCC and subsequently Nasser’s reign of power.
Throughout the time period between the Wafd’s first tenure of power and the military coup of July 23, 1952, the labor movement was in constant flux. Over this expanse, though the labor movement consistently identified with nationalist goals for reasons described above, the continued failure of the Wafd to substantiate any gains for the labor movements while in power slowly led to a weakening of its popular base among workers. The inability of the Wafd to substantiate its claims of supporting workers came to be seen more because of its background as a landowner-bourgeoise dominated movement. So by the time that the RCC released its six-point plan, which included; the abolition of the remnants of feudalism, the promotion of social justice, and full Egyptian independence, the labor movement came with nearly unanimous support. The decades of parliamentary democracy had failed to produce any substantive gains for labor, had not got Egypt full independence, and had not rid the country of the popularly disliked monarchy. The success of the military coup in accomplishing at least this last goal gave it immediate substantive credibility.
After the RCC’s initial rise to power, unions (such as the transport workers) called off planned and/or threatened strikes and vocally expressed hope in the new regime. However, groups such as the Founding Committee for a General Federation of Trade Unions (FCGFTU), though expressing hope in new regime, also called for the restoration of democracy, lifting of martial law, and the restoration of democratic liberties. This exemplifies the trend for labor’s independence that had begun to develop during the fluctuating period of Wafd control. The RCC however, soon demonstrated its feelings on independent labor activism.
A strike at Bayda Dyers Company took place on August 12th, as workers began a sit in at the mill, and some fires were set to auxiliary buildings. On the 13th Army troops arrived and were greeted by multiple protests. Shots were allegedly fired and the resulting aftermath left two soldiers on policemen, and four workers killed, with many others wounded. The military authorities quickly arrested 545 workers charging twenty-nine with various offenses. Two prominent labor organizers in the region were sentenced to death and many of the others charged served substantial jail time. This response to labor activism set the precedent for how the military regime of the RCC would deal with labor unrest that spilled over to means outside of government sanctioned control.
Even with the blunt repression used by the RCC, labor organizations were quick not to condemn its actions. The DMNL and FCGFETU issued statements condemning the violence and linked it to pro-imperialist interest. When the sentences were announced both mentioned organizations loaded speakers (provided by the military) onto trucks and drove through working class areas urging people for calm. The support from these labor organizations came with the hope that in the future labor could work through the established government to press its concerns. This however would prove unrealistic.
To assert its control over the labor movement, the RCC had to effectively purge the movement of its independent elements. Politically this meant shoring up support among the popular majority of workers, so that other elements could be eradicated. This came on December 8th, 1952, with the inaction of three separate pieces of labor legislation.
The first of which was the Law of Individual Contracts. The LIC allowed for free medical, transportation to factories, increased severance, longer annual vacations, and the right to appeal dismissal. Arbitration and conciliation in Labor Disputes required mandatory mediation on all labor disputes, and the Law of Trade Unions allowed agricultural workers to join trade unions, which had to this point not been allowed. Though the legislation seemed a concrete victory for labor, and it did in fact win the RCC broad support, it also implemented severe restrictions on mass organization. The laws dissolved the development of independent labor federations, established separate blue and white collar unions for employees within the same industry – further fractioning labor organization- outlawed federations of labor, and made union membership compulsory for any workplace where there was a two thirds majority already joined – allowing owners to set up their own unions and then require all workers to join once they were able to induce two thirds to do so.
The new labor laws, along with earlier land reform did win the RCC broad popular support from workers and peasants. Soon there after all political parties were dissolved, newspapers closed and 101 political figures arrested. The only party not affected by this broad crackdown however was the Muslim Brotherhood, who up until that point supported the military regime and was rewarded by not being considered a political entity. Soon however, political crises ensued.
Growing popular support for the re-institution of parliamentary democracy boiled over. During a memorial held by the Muslim Brothers on January 12th 1954, many of the speakers denounced Abd al-Nasir as a pro-American dictator. Soon after the RCC declared the Muslim Brothers a political organization, which meant their dissolution according to earlier laws enacted. Nasir then attempted to seize power by assuming the position of premiership and the presidency, relieving Muhammad Najib from the latter. Mass protest broke out and Nasir was forced to reinstate Najib, who subsequently relinquished press censorship. Then on March 25th the RCC declared it would formally allow the creation of political parties, and promised to disband itself by July 24th. Immediately the Army protested, demanding the RCC retain power. The Muslim Brothers also withdrew support for the opposition because of the resurgent popularity of the Wafd – which came about once press censorship was lifted – and meant that in the instance of a free election the Wafd would be returned to power.
During the crisis however the concrete measures taken by the RCC to establish support among the working classes proved vital. Though the far left and proponents of an independent trade unionism supported the opposition, a key constituency of workers – most notably the Cairo Transport Workers- supported the RCC because of the gains provided by its labor legislation. The CTW held strikes and rallies in support of the RCC, which effectively had the result of curbing popular demand for its dissolution. To say the least the RCC and Abd al-Nasir weathered the storm and came out with far greater power, and a consolidation of government that was enough to secure its form, and domination of Egyptian politics. Because of the laws enacted by the RCC, and subsequent legislation by Abd al-Nasser an independent workers movement is to this point of no consequence in Egyptian politics.
The co-option of the labor movement into a paternalist relationship, with the state as its head, early on by the Wafd proved to be the foundation for a habitual pattern of nationalist parties and the leaders of labor movements. Because of the earlier experiences of the rise and fall of labor’s power, with that of the Nationalist Wafd party, labor was inclined to initially support the nationalist RCC in its campaign to consolidate power, even when that meant initially hurting itself. This coupled with the concrete concessions made to workers early in December 8th 1952, proved enough to galvanize worker support for the military dictatorship, allowing it to weather its greatest initial challenge. In its aftermath Abd al-Nasir’s control of Egyptian politics became solidified enough that subsequent labor legislation – if there was any – was met with no resistance.
This pattern of State Paternalism persisted past Nasir’s reign and to the current day, and is what has aided in the current situation of the Egyptian working class. Sadat’s declaration of the Infitah, and the subsequent liberal policies pursued by his predecessors have found no mass opposition from those whom it adversely effects most, as the forms of organization which give rise to labor independence and collective bargaining power were stripped forever stripped in March 1954.
This understanding of the historical experience of Egyptian labor aids one, in an attempt to understand the State’s relationship to economy, and the current organization of socio-economic classes in Egypt. This is integral in understanding the effects and relationships between macro-economic Egyptian policy and the pressures currently exerted on it by international institutions such as the WTO and World Bank.

Class realization in a new society

It is an interesting thing when one comes into an understanding of his ‘class’ in a society. I have done it before, its slow process was delayed and drawn out through an overall awakining to the conciousness of my self, that lasted some three to four years. To realize your existence in a society, the roots of which form upon the finite, and socially obstructed human mind, is to question the entire moral fabric of oneself. To realize the understanding that presents itself upon the material necessities of status is to see your skin is merely an accessory to your personified being, that un-tangible, marketable anatomy.
What I experienced now is class allowed through the aetherial blanket brought by military, economic and racist ascendancy. I am publicy scorned, resented, yet still respected. People want to know me because of what my skin and clothing represent. Mostly they want to know me for the insignia of my passport. I cannot sit idily – alone, without the random stranger to be keened in interest of myself. Some for whom I am, their acknowledgement based on a material related recognition, but more for the status afforded by my kin. What is seen in me is a door. One through which a person may enter upon a society separated and dominant too their own. I offer the material promise of wealth, and the theoretical dominance of race. The latter having been bred through, first, colonial dominance, and presently, the international “aid” of the same racist and oriental minded institutions which promise the wealth. The vicious inter-related system of internationalism
I have over twenty numbers written in varing degrees of English, two in Arabic. These are not people I know outside of the random conversation we may have had. A botched attempt at buying the paper, at one point, a lone, coffee at the ahwa, an old man handing me a pomeegranite, the myriad of circumstantial situations rival that of Odysseus and his Aegean crew.
I will not call these numbers. The interests of myself are not there. If I am to be used to what am I doing myself? However, some who I have become to know, I have opened in much the way these look to open me. I, conversely, have willingly opened to them.

It is at once a cohesive, degrading, racists, classcist, mysoginoist, and impeding force of human organization.

What the Hubub of Ramadan is really about...from a westerner

What the hubbub of Ramadan is truly about…
As I stood in the road today, once again attempting to flag down a ride home, a white-ish, somewhat old Land Rover approached from the direction of my gaze. Nothing stuck out about the vehical in the Iftar rush of drivers home, but as it approached me, it slowed down and the woman in the passenger seat extender her hand. What she extended in her hand left me at first confused, and then flattered. She had handed, roughly, a five-pound plastic sack of freshly butchered lamb. I was taken aback, but responded with a traditional hand over my heart and warm shokran. Then as the couple had appeared, they drove off down the road, leaving me standing with a translucent bag of raw meat.
This sort of behavior is typical of Ramadan in Islamic areas. To give food to those less fortunate, apparently I looked the part, extra money to charity, or even a Ramadan lamp is the cultural moor. It is apparent when one walks the street of Cairo, as the sun begins its final decent to the desert in the west, everywhere one looks there are tables being set, laden with food, almost burdened, with food and with drink. Standing as oases in the wasteland of asphalt for those of the community, or one who just passes by, to come and eat and join in community. It is truly a touching matter to bear witness, and has no comparison in our cultures of the west.
With this customary charity and piousness through charity, comes also the daylight fasting through out the month. From when the sun rises until one can see the first two stars in the twilight sky, there is no food, no water or otherwise, and no smoking. When this routine fast is broken, that is Iftar. Now I’m not sure which of the three parts of the fast weigh heaviest on the Caraneese’ mind, but the unison of the orchestra of lighters may give one a clue.
I was invited to Iftar at Muhanad’s (yes his name is spelt that way) house. His mother had cooked up some amazing food, and I got to spend time with Muhanad, his family, and an assorted collection of foreigners. (Sudan, Brit, American etc…) Also there are Ramadan lanterns. These gaudy gold plastic things are everywhere. Apparently the story behind them is that way back when women did not go out at night, especially not alone. However most activity takes place at night during Ramadan and it becomes essential. So some king somewhere decreed that a boy be assigned with a lantern to walk in front of groups of women at night during Ramadan as a means to tell everyone that they were approaching and to give them some security. Since then the tradition has taken off and now, most houses, and at the least every small neighborhood community has a Ramadan lantern of some sort. Whether it be small, or six feet tall like some that I have seen.
Early in my stay here I happened to wander down a street and come across a score of people attempting to hang the community lantern over a street cross-section. It was rather amusing to see kids running around, men yelling- though not angrily- attempting to direct the people standing on their balconies to hoist this monstrosity into the air and then get it some what centered.
This whole celebration, and the cultural moores that surround it are really something beautiful. It is a time of increased piety, prayer, community awareness, and above all care for those who are less fortunate. It is a means to set an example for one month of the year, for what the rest of the year should look like. Whether it does or does not one will just have to wait and see.
~Adam